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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 980026-CA 
vs. : 
EMIL MARTIN SUNTER, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant was convicted of one third-degree felony count of distributing or 
arranging the distribution of a controlled substance pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(l)(a)(ii) (1998), and four third-degree felony counts of unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a) (1998) in the Seventh 
Judicial District Court of Carbon County, State of Utah, the Honorable Judge Bryce K. 
Bryner presiding. This Court has jurisdiction of the case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2)G) (1996). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in denying defendant's motion to 
withdraw his guilty pleas? 
"We review a trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under an 
abuse-of-discretion standard." State v. Blair. 868 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1993); State v. 
Penman. 964 P.2d 1157,1160 (Utah App. 1998). "However, this court may find an abuse 
of discretion only if we conclude that 'no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted 
by the trial court.'" State v. Schweitzer. 943 P.2d at 649,657 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting 
State v. Gerrard. 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978)). 
2. Did the trial court err in ordering that the sentences for two of 
the offenses to which defendant pled guilty run consecutively? 
"We review the sentencing decisions of a trial court for abuse of discretion. Abuse 
of discretion 'may be manifest if the actions of the judge in sentencing were 'inherently 
unfair' or if the judge imposed a 'clearly excessive sentence.'" State v. Houk. 906 P.2d 
907,909 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (citations omitted). See also Schweitzer. 943 P.2d at 651. 
"However, this court may find an abuse of discretion only if we conclude that 'no 
reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court. '"Schweitzer. 943 P.2d 
at 651 (quoting State v. Gerrard. 584 P,2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes and rule are reproduced in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1995) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (Supp. 1998) 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged in 11 separate informations with drug-related offenses (R. 
48 at 2, R. 50 at 16). He pled guilty to five third-degree felony counts. Under the plea 
agreement, the State agreed to dismiss the six remaining cases (R. 49 at 15). Defendant 
made a timely motion to withdraw his guilty pleas (R. 13). The trial court denied the 
motion (R. 27). On December 16, 1997, the trial court sentenced defendant to 0-5 year 
prison terms on each of the offenses, ordering that the four sentences for unlawful 
possession or use of a controlled substance would run concurrently, and that the sentence 
for unlawful distribution of a controlled substance would run consecutively with one of 
the sentences for possession (R. 35). 
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 39). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the two-and-a-half months between July 12, 1996 and October 24, 1996, 
defendant, in the presence of a police informant wearing a hidden microphone, committed 
nine offenses involving possession or distribution of various controlled substances. (R. 
1; Supp. R. 53, 139, 185). Evidence obtained through the informant formed the 
evidentiary basis for four informations filed against him charging five first-degree 
felonies, three second-degree felonies, and one third-degree felony (id.). At the time of 
his arrest on May 1, 1997, defendant was found to be in possession of illegally obtained 
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Lortab, and was charged with another third-degree felony (Supp. R. 97). In total, 
prosecutors filed 11 informations against him (R. 48 at 2, R. 50 at 16).1 
The evidence against defendant included written police reports and audiotapes 
made with the assistance of the informant (R. 50 at 5,14). Defense counsel requested and 
received copies of the written reports, but delivery of the requested audiotapes was 
delayed (R. 15-16). Late in the afternoon of July 21, 1997-the day before the scheduled 
preliminary hearings in the 11 cases—the prosecutor telephoned defense counsel to tell her 
the audiotapes were ready (R. 16,48 at 2). Defense counsel declined his offer to deliver 
the tapes to her home that evening, and instead arranged for the tapes to be brought to her 
office and put through the mail slot (R. 16). 
Defense counsel appeared in court the next morning at the time set for the 
preliminary hearings and represented to the court that the parties had agreed to a plea 
bargain (R. 48 at 2). Under the agreement, defendant would plead guilty to five third-
degree felonies, and the State would dismiss the other six cases (R. 48 at 2-3). Defense 
counsel received a continuance until July 29 to allow her to prepare the necessary 
documentation (R. 48 at 3, 10). 
Neither defendant nor defense counsel listened to the audiotapes in the interim (R. 
16-17,20). 
'The record does not contain the exact charges alleged in six of the informations, 
which were dismissed in accordance with the plea agreement. 
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On July 29, 1997 defendant entered his five guilty pleas (R. 49 at 6-7).2 The court 
engaged in a detailed colloquy with defendant in accordance with rule 11, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure.3 During the colloquy, the court asked defendant, "Are you entering 
a plea of guilty because you did in fact commit each of these five offenses?" (R. 49 at 17). 
Defendant replied, "Yes, your Honor" (id.). Defense counsel produced five documents, 
each titled "Statement of Defendant" and signed by defendant (R. 49 at 20). The 
statements contained, among other averments, defendant's statements that he that he was 
competent to plead guilty, and that he understood, as to each offense, the elements of the 
offense, the consequences of entering his plea, and that the plea was entered knowingly 
and voluntarily (R. 7-12; Supp. R. 59-64, 99-104, 145-50, 192-97). Defendant 
acknowledged in open court that he understood and had signed the statements (R. at 20-
21). The court found that defendant had "knowingly and voluntarily tendered his plea of 
specifically, defendant pled guilty to distributing marijuana, and to possessing 
methamphetamine on two occasions, possessing heroin, and possessing Lortab (R. 49 at 
18-20). 
3The court informed defendant of the following: his right to be presumed innocent, 
his right against compulsory self-incrimination, his right to trial by jury, his right to 
confront and cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses, his right to subpoena defense 
witnesses, his right to appeal the verdict, the nature and elements of the offenses to which 
the pleas were entered, the prosecution's obligation to prove the elements of each offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the minimum and maximum sentences for the offenses to 
which defendant entered his pleas, the possibility of consecutive sentences, the factual 
basis for the pleas, his limited right to appeal, and the time limit for filing a motion to 
withdraw his pleas (R. 49 at 8-15, 18-20, 38). Defendant verified that he understood his 
rights as they were explained to him. 
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guilty to each of the five cases. I believe that he understands the consequences of entering 
those pleas, so Til order that those pleas be entered" (R. 49 at 21). 
Defendant filed a timely motion to withdraw his pleas (R. 13). In an affidavit filed 
with the motion, defendant stated that neither he nor his attorney had reviewed the 
audiotapes until after the pleas were entered (R. 20). He stated that in listening to the 
tapes, he found "substantial discrepancies between the audio tapes and the written reports. 
The differences are such that I believe I have legitimate defenses to the charges against 
me." (R. 20). At the hearing on the motion, defense counsel explained that during the 
week between the time she received the tapes and the date defendant entered his pleas, "I 
didn't have time-I figured it would probably take six to eight hours for me to sit down and 
listen to and compare, et cetera, with those tapes. And during that time, I was working on 
other matters" (R. 50 at 7-8). Defense counsel listed the following "inconsistencies and 
discrepancies" (R. 50 at 9) revealed by the tapes: 
1. On one of the tapes, the confidential informant "takes money out of her 
pocket and gives it back to [a police officer]. And this was after he had 
allegedly searched her and apparently had not searched her very well 
because she still had money in her pocket that she didn't know about" (R. 
50 at 9-10). 
2. "[T ]he report indicates that it was Mr. Sunter who was purchasing from 
[the informant]. When according to Mr. Sunter, . . . it was she who was 
selling it to him and not him selling it to her" (R. 50 at 10). 
3. "Officer Barnes in his reports writes tha t . . . this deal is going down in the 
parking l o t . . . . Mr. Sunter indicates that actually he and [the informant] 
were at Radio Shack. . . buying some batteries . . . " (R. 50 at 10). 
4. "The written report indicates that the only two people present are Mr. Sunter 
and [the informant]. And as it turns out, there is another person. In one 
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case, her son. In one case, her daughter. Who is actually where they say 
Mr. Sunter should have been and he wasn't there. He was somewhere else" 
(R. 50 at 10.). 
The trial court denied defendant's motion, finding that defendant had the tapes for 
6 days prior to the entry of his pleas, and did not request a continuance to enable him to 
listen to the tapes (R. 29). The court further observed that in entering the pleas, it had 
conducted a detailed Rule 11 colloquy advising defendant of the rights he was waiving 
and the consequences of entering a guilty plea (id.). In addition, the court noted it had 
received written statements from defendant at the time he entered his pleas, and stated that 
defendant had not disputed the prosecutor's oral recitation of factual basis for each plea 
(R. 29-30). The court held that good cause did not exist to allow defendant to withdraw 
his pleas (R. 30). 
At defendant's sentencing, the trial court made careful findings in accordance with 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (Supp. 1998) before imposing consecutive sentences. The 
court first considered the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, finding that although 
the offenses were felonies, "the gravity of the nature of those offenses is not as great as 
they otherwise could be" (R. 52 at 8). The court then found that defendant was 53 years 
of age and had 20 arrests on his record (id.). "[T]he Court does not find that Mr. Sunter 
. . . by any consideration has a clean slate It's significant that a major portion of the 
record of the defendant occurred long in the past, and the Court for that reason does not 
consider those to be influential in the Court's decision because they are so remote in time" 
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(R. 52 at 8-9). On the subject of defendant's character, the court found that he was 
nonviolent and respectful in the courtroom (R. 52 at 9). The court then addressed 
defendant's rehabilitative needs: 
This is the one that gives the court troubles. And that is 
that, Mr. Sunter, you are now 53 years old and facing going 
back to prison at this time, at this stage in your life I'm sure 
you're going to be thinking about that for a while and what you 
could have done with your life. 
But the Court finds that you have not taken advantage of 
the chance to be rehabilitated. You've committed five separate 
felonies . . . within a ten month period, . . . and I don't know 
what your chances for rehabilitation are. Those opportunities 
are there at the prison to obtain counseling, and I hope you 
would avail yourself of those. 
I know that you have submitted letters to the Court where 
you have been seeking to meet in the IOP program with our 
local mental health center. And, apparently, they have brought 
several classes over to the jail that you've taken advantage of. 
So maybe you are trying. On the other hand, maybe you're just 
trying to snow me. I don't know. You're the only one who 
knows for sure. 
But in any event, I think the question of rehabilitation 
works both ways. In the past, you've shown that you have not 
taken the opportunity to be rehabilitated.... 
So having considered each of those factors, the Court 
finds that would be appropriate because of the refusal to - in the 
past to rehabilitate yourself and take advantage of the chance for 
rehabilitation, the Court finds that it would be appropriate to 
impose one consecutive sentence in this case." 
(R. 52 at 10-11). The court sentenced defendant to four concurrent 0-5 year terms on the 
possession convictions, and ordered that the 0-5 year sentence for distribution run 
consecutively with one of the possession terms (R. 36, R. 52 at 12). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to withdraw 
his guilty pleas. Defendant has failed to support by argument or authority his position 
that failure to review discovery materials constitutes good cause for withdrawal of a guilty 
plea. In addition, defendant cites inapplicable case and statutory law in support of his 
claim. Consequently, his claim is inadequately briefed and this Court should refuse to 
consider it. However, if the Court decides to address the merits, it should affirm because 
the defendant's plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily, and trial court correctly found 
that defendant's failure to review the audiotapes did not constitute good cause to withdraw 
his pleas. 
Defendant's claim that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive 
sentences is likewise without merit. The trial court reasonably determined that 
defendant's uncertain prognosis for rehabilitation warranted consecutive terms. In 
addition, the consecutive sentences were both 0-5 year terms, which gave the Board of 
Pardons nearly immediate authority to exercise its discretion to parole defendant. 
9 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
HIS MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEAS 
A "withdrawal of a plea of guilty is a privilege, not a right... [and] is within the 
sound discretion of the trial court." State v. Gallegos. 738 P.2d 1040,1041 (Utah 1987); 
see also State v. Thorup. 841 P.2d 746,747 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied. 853 P.2d 897 
(Utah 1993). Utah Code Ann. § 77-16-6(2)(a) (1995) states that "[a] plea of guilty or no 
contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with leave of the court." 
Utah's appellate courts have held that good cause exists as a matter of law when a lower 
court accepts the entry of plea of guilty or no contest without strictly complying with the 
requirements of rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See, e^ , State v. Gibbons. 
740 P.2d 1309, 1312-14 (Utah 1987); State v. Smith. 812 P.2d 470, 476 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
A. Defendant Has Failed To Adequately Brief the Issues of Whether He 
Demonstrated Good Cause to Withdraw His Guilty Pleas or Whether 
the Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Denying his Motion. 
Defendant does not dispute the thoroughness of the trial court's inquiry and 
findings pursuant to rule 11, and does not identify in the facts of this case any other 
circumstance recognized by Utah's appellate courts as constituting good cause for 
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withdrawal of a guilty plea.4 Instead, defendant explains that he was "not given the 
opportunity to review the actual audiotapes of the incidents until after he had entered his 
pleas pursuant to the plea arrangement negotiated by his attorney."5 Appellant's Brief at 
9-10. Since defendant has failed to support by argument or authority his proposition that 
failure to review discovery materials constitutes good cause for withdrawal of a guilty 
plea, he has failed to meet his burden to brief his claim that the trial court erred in failing 
to allow him to withdraw his guilty pleas. 
Under rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a party to an appeal must 
provide an argument containing the "contentions and reasons of the [party] with respect 
to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the 
4
 For example, a trial court may abuse its discretion in refusing to allow 
withdrawal of a guilty plea where a defendant is found not to have had adequate 
knowledge and understanding of the consequences of entering his plea, State v. 
Vasilacopoulos. 756 P.2d 92, 95 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied. 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 
1988); or where a defendant entered a plea in reliance on the illusory promises of a 
prosecutor, State v. Copeland. 765 P.2d 1266, 1276 (Utah 1988) (defendant relied on 
promise of prosecutor to recommend commitment to hospital rather than prison, not 
knowing that prosecutor's recommendation did not bind the judge). In addition, it may be 
an abuse of discretion for a trial court to refuse to allow withdrawal of a guilty plea where 
"new and indisputably pivotal evidence" arises. See State v. Gallegos. 738 P.2d 1040, 
1042 (Utah 1987) (victim recanted her previous testimony). 
defendant's assessment of the facts on appeal contradicts defense counsel's 
repeated acknowledgment to the trial court that counsel had possession of the tapes for a 
week before defendant entered his pleas (R. 16, R. 50 at 23-24). The record indicates that 
the problem was not that defendant was "not given the opportunity" to hear the tapes, but 
rather that defendant and his counsel were given the tapes, but failed to listen to them. 
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trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." 
Utah's appellate courts have ruled that when a party fails to comply with this rule, the 
court will decline to address the issue because Ha reviewing court is entitled to have the 
issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in 
which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research." State v. 
Bishop, 753 P.2d 439,450 (Utah 1988), quoting Williamson v. OpsahL 416 N.E.2d 783, 
784 (1981); see also Burns v. Summerhavs. 927 P.2d 197, 199 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); 
State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
In Point I of his brief, defendant cites as authority a number of federal cases and 
"Rule 32(d)." Appellant's Brief at 8. However, those cases do not interpret Utah law, and 
the cited (presumably federal) rule does not control this Court. In addition, defendant 
relies on Utah Code Ann. § 39-6-38 (l)(b) (1994), which states that "[a] plea of not guilty 
shall be entered in the record, and the court shall proceed as though the accused had 
pleaded not guilty, if the accused: . . . after a plea of guilty raises a matter inconsistent 
with the plea." That provision is taken from the Utah Code of Military Justice, which 
applies to military court proceedings involving members of the National Guard. Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 39-6-3(1 )(a), -16 (1994). Defendant does not explain the meaning of 
section 39-6-38(1) or its relevance to this case. 
Defendant has failed to adequately brief the issue of why, on the facts of this case, 
the trial court should have found that good cause existed for him to withdraw his pleas or 
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to explain how the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion. In addition, he 
has failed to explain how the authorities he cites apply to the matters at issue here. 
Therefore, this Court should decline to consider his claim. 
B. Even if the Issues Had Been Adequately Briefed, Defendant Did Not 
Demonstrate Good Cause to Withdraw His Pleas, 
Although defendant quotes State v. Gallegos. 738 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Utah 1987), 
as stating that "a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea should, in general, be 
liberally granted,1' that general statement does not automatically mandate withdrawal in 
this (or any) case. "This liberal-approach language [in Gallegos]... is directed to the trial 
court's exercise of discretion. The language in no way alters the statutory requirement of 
good cause for the withdrawal of a guilty plea nor our abuse-of-discretion standard of 
review." State v. Thorup. 841 P.2d 746,747 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 
897 (Utah 1993). 
In general, good cause to withdraw a guilty plea exists only when "the defendant 
can show that the plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily." State v. Munson, 351 
Utah Adv. Rep. 31,33 (Utah 1998). Compliance with rule 11 creates a presumption that 
the defendant's pleas were entered voluntarily. State v. Thorup. 841 P.2d at 747. The 
trial court's detailed rule 11 colloquy and the written Statements of Defendant provide 
ample support for the judge's determination that the pleas were entered knowingly and 
voluntarily (R. 49 at 8-15,18-20, 38; R. 7-12; Supp. R. 59-64,99-104,145-50, 192-97). 
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Defendant appears to argue that if he had been aware of the contents of the 
audiotapes, he would not have entered his pleas. It is a settled rule that a voluntary, 
unconditional guilty plea constitutes a waiver of the right to appeal all nonjurisdictional 
issues. State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1163 (Utah App. 1998); see also State v. 
Munson. 351 Utah Adv. Rep. 31 (Utah 1998); James v. Galetka. 965 P.2d 567,351 (Utah 
App. 1998). The entry of a guilty plea operates as an admission of the essential elements 
of the offense, and precludes a defendant from later attacking the sufficiency of evidence. 
State v. Parsons J81 P.2d 1275, 1277 (Utah 1989): State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220, 223 
n. 1 (Utah App. 1995). 
In Penman, the defendant similarly claimed that if he had known about exculpatory 
evidence, he would not have entered his plea. Penman. 964 P.2d at 1163. He argued that 
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea should have been granted because of the 
prosecution's failure to disclose an allegedly exculpatory ballistics report. Id. The Court 
held that "[g]iven the trial court's finding [that defendant knew of the report], the evidence 
apparently supporting it, and Penman's lack of explanation or argument concerning it, we 
must conclude that he or his counsel knew or should have known that the ballistics test 
had been conducted and a report prepared." Id. at 1163-64. The Court refused to allow 
the defendant to withdraw his plea. Id. at 1164. 
The reasoning underlying the Penman decision applies here. Defense counsel and 
defendant both acknowledged to the trial court that they knew about and received the 
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audiotapes well in advance of the entry of defendant's pleas (R. 16-17,20; R. 50 at 23-24). 
The trial court's finding that defendant's failure to review the tapes did not constitute good 
cause for withdrawal of his pleas is supported by Penman. 
Here, even if defendant had not waived his ability to contest the evidence, the four 
alleged discrepancies asserted by defendant at the hearing on his motion were vague and 
of questionable relevance. For example, defendant did not explain how the fact that the 
confidential informant had money in her pocket after being searched by police exonerated 
him (R. 50 at 9-10, supra at 6). Another of the taped "discrepancies" showed that, by 
defense counsel's own admission, defendant was making a buy from the informant, rather 
than the other way around (R. 50 at 10, supra at 6). Again, the exculpatory power of that 
distinction is unclear. The third tape presenting a "discrepancy" was interpreted by 
defendant as a recording of him buying batteries at Radio Shack, rather than drugs in a 
parking lot (R. 50 at 10, supra at 6). However, since it may be presumed that the 
informant would interpret the tape differently, the discrepancy by itself does not constitute 
good cause. Finally, defendant claimed that the written reports stated that on two 
occasions only defendant and the informant were present, while the audiotape indicated 
that the informant's son or daughter was present (R. 50 at 10, supra at 6). Defendant 
failed to explain how an audiotape, which recorded only sounds, could prove that 
defendant was not present and in possession of a controlled substance. In summary, the 
alleged discrepancies are of doubtful probative value. Cf State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 
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479 (Utah App. 1991) ("appellant's after-the-fact speculation that the State could not have 
carried [its evidentiary] burden does not create good cause as a matter of law to withdraw 
his no-contest plea"). 
Finally, this court may affirm on the alternative ground that defendant failed to 
explain to the trial court which discrepancy rendered which plea unknowing or 
involuntary. This case involves five separate guilty pleas to five separate offenses, and 
defendant has failed-both below and on appeal-to specify which pleas should be 
withdrawn on the basis of which factual discrepancy. For example, defendant has not 
shown that any discrepancies between the audiotapes and written reports entitled him to 
withdraw his guilty plea as to being in possession of Lortab at the time of his arrest, since 
there is no indication in the record that that charge involved tape-recorded evidence. The 
trial court would have been justified in denying his motion for its lack of specificity alone. 
Cf. State v. Price, 837 P.2d 578, 584 (Utah App. 1992) (allegation that exculpatory 
evidence existed, unsupported by affidavits from potential witnesses and consisting of 
"self-serving conjecture," insufficient to set aside guilty plea). This Court may affirm the 
trial court on any proper grounds, even though the trial court assigned a different reason 
for its decision. State v. Gallegos. 712 P.2d 207, 209 (Utah 1985) 
In summary, the alleged existence of exculpatory evidence which defendant failed 
to review prior to entry of his guilty pleas did not provide good cause for withdrawal of 
the pleas. Here, the trial court appropriately found the pleas to have been entered 
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knowingly and voluntarily, and found that where defendant had possession of the tapes 
for six days prior to entering his pleas, he did not demonstrate good cause (R. 30). For 
those reasons, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw the 
pleas, and its ruling on the issue should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS 
DISCRETION IN ORDERING THAT DEFENDANT 
SERVE CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES 
Defendant argues that the trial court did not properly consider the gravity and 
circumstances of defendant's crimes, or defendant's history, character and rehabilitative 
needs. Appellant's Brief at 8. To the contrary, the record demonstrates that the trial court 
thoroughly considered each of those factors (R. 52 at 7-11, discussed supra at 7-8). 
However, the court considered those factors to be outweighed by the facts that defendant 
had committed five felonies within a 10-month period, and, at age 53, had not taken 
advantage of chance to be rehabilitated (R. 52 at 10). The court found that defendant's 
uncertain prognosis for rehabilitation warranted the imposition of consecutive sentences 
(R. 52 at 10-11). Consecutive sentences were appropriate given defendant's 
circumstances, and the trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion. See State v. 
Montova. 929 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah App. 1996) (consecutive sentences neither clearly 
excessive nor inherently unfair based on defendant's rehabilitative and criminal histories 
and his rehabilitative needs). 
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This case is readily distinguishable from State v. Smith, 909 P. 2d 236 (Utah 1995), 
State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1993), and State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998), 
all cited by defendant. In contrast to this case, Smith, Strunk, and Galli each involved the 
consecutive imposition of lengthy minimum mandatory terms, which deprived the Board 
of Pardons of discretion to consider or grant parole for many years. "[T]he Legislature, 
in enacting indeterminate sentencing laws, has opted to give the Board of Pardons wide 
latitude in deciding what a maximum sentence ought to be. The Board is in a far better 
position than a court to monitor a defendant's subsequent behavior and possible progress 
toward rehabilitation while in prison and to adjust the maximum sentence accordingly.11 
State v. Smith, 909 P. 2d at 244, (citing State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d at 1301 (Utah 1993). 
In Smith, the court vacated a defendant's four consecutive 15-year-to-life sentences, 
finding that consecutive sentencing gave the Board of Pardons Mno discretion to release 
defendant, irrespective of his progress, until sixty years have elapsed, which is tantamount 
to a minimum mandatory life sentence — a sentence that the Legislature has only permitted 
for capital murder." Smith, 909 P.2d at 244-45. Similarly, in Strunk, the court held that 
consecutive minimum mandatory sentences totaling 24 years robbed the Board of Pardons 
of any flexibility to parole the defendant (who had committed the offenses at age 16) 
sooner. Strunk, 846 P.2d at 1301. In Galli, the court vacated a defendant's three 
consecutive 5-year-to-life sentences, based, in part, on a finding that defendant was a good 
candidate for rehabilitation. Galli, 967 P.2d at 938. The trial court here expressed its 
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doubts regarding defendant's prospects for rehabilitation based on his past failure to 
rehabilitate himself (R. 52 at 10-11). This case is distinguishable from Smith. Strunk. and 
Galli because minimum mandatory sentences were not imposed. 
The 0-to-5-year consecutive sentences imposed in this case allowed the Board of 
Pardons nearly immediate opportunity to exercise its discretion to parole defendant. In 
fact, defendant theoretically could be on the street now. At defendant's December 9,1997 
sentencing, the court gave him over seven months credit for time served since his arrest 
on May 1, 1997 (R. 52 at 13). Defendant has therefore served more than 20 months on 
his sentences. Since the range of each of his terms began at zero years, the Board of 
Pardons, in the exercise of its discretion, could have paroled him already if it had 
determined that his release was appropriate.6 
The consecutive sentences imposed in this case were so short in duration that the 
concerns raised in Smith. Strunk. and Galli —that consecutive sentences deprive the Board 
of Pardons of discretion—are inapplicable. The trial court's imposition of consecutive 
sentences was neither inherently unfair nor clearly excessive, but was an appropriate 
exercise of the court's discretion. Therefore, the sentences should be affirmed. 
According to Utah Admin Code § R671-201-1 (1998), "[a]n inmate who is 
serving a sentence of up to five years . . . will be eligible for a [parole] hearing after the 
service of ninety days." 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
defendant's convictions and sentences. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this j ^ day of M OAOJK^ 
1999. 
JAN GRAHAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CATHERINE M. JOHNSON 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
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ADDENDUM A 
CRIMINAL CODE 
76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences — Limita-
tions — Definition. 
( D A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of mQre 
than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences 
for the offenses. Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently unless the 
court states in the sentence that they shall run consecutively. 
(2) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively 
if the later offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole 
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing 
would be inappropriate. 
(3) If an order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences 
shall run consecutively or concurrently, and the Board of Pardons and Parole 
has reason to believe that the later offense occurred while the person was 
imprisoned or on parole for the earlier offense, the board shall request 
clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, the court shall enter 
an amended order of commitment stating whether the sentences are to run 
consecutively or concurrently, 
(4) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and 
the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining 
whether to imoose consecutive sentences. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a 
single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
(6) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all 
sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment. However, this 
limitation does not apply if an offense for which the defendant is sentenced 
authorizes the death penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. 
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which 
were committed prior to imposition of sentence for any one or more of 
them; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the 
present sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal 
jurisdiction. 
(8) In determining the effect of consecutive sentences and the manner in 
which they shall be served, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall treat the 
defendant as though he has been committed for a single term that shall consist 
of the aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the 
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum 
term, if any, constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum 
terms. 
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concur-
rently with the other or with a sentence presently being served, the lesser 
sentence shall merge into the greater and the greater shall be the term to be 
served. If the sentences are equal and concurrent, they shall merge into one 
sentence with the most recent conviction constituting the time to be served. 
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of 
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity 
of any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually 
served under the commitments. 
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to 
impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed 
to a secure correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has 
not been terminated or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of 
where the person is located. 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 11. Pleas. 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be 
represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The 
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a 
reasonable time to confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason 
of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative 
not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or 
if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not 
guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be 
set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an 
early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or 
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly 
waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the 
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial 
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court 
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense 
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to 
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that 
the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it 
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant 
or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the 
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that 
may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record 
or, if used, an affidavit reciting these factors after the court has established 
that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the 
affidavit. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be 
sufficient that the affidavit has been read or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to 
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
Rule 11 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record 
or, if used, an affidavit reciting these factors after the court has established 
that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the 
affidavit. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be 
sufficient that the affidavit has been read or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to 
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing-any motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground 
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to 
make a motion under Section 77-13-6. 
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any-other party has 
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included 
offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved by 
the court. 
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall 
advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not 
binding on the court. 
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea 
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney. 
(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon 
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement 
and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge 
may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the 
proposed disposition will be approved. 
(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in confor-
mity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and then 
call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a 
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no 
contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a 
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A 
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea. 
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to 
the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a 
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance 
with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103. 
(Amended effective May 1, 1993; January 1, 1996; November 1, 1997.) 
UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea. 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause 
shown and with leave of the court. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by 
motion and shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the plea. 
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned person under 
Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
History: C. 1953, 77-13-6, enacted by L. Amendment Notee. — The 1994 araend-
1980, ch. 15, { 2; 1989, ch. 65, t 1; 1994, ch. ment, effective May 2, 1994, substituted "Rule 
16, S 1. 65B" for "Rule 65B(i)" in Subsection (3). 
